Abstract
In the context of post-war Anglo-American relations over South East Asia it seems a remarkable irony that Britain came closer to intervening militarily alongside the United States in the comparatively insignificant state of Laos in 1961–2, rather than during the collapse of French Indo-China in 1954, or South Vietnam after 1965. One can equally well pose Khrushchev’s question to US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson of British policy at this juncture: ‘why take risks over Laos?’1 The Laotian crisis, which was the first to confront the new Kennedy Administration, in fact revealed much about the strengths and shortcomings of the Anglo-American alliance from the British perspective. On the one hand, Macmillan was eventually able, in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, to reinforce Kennedy’s own instincts against large-scale military involvement. On the other, Britain still came close to being sucked by hawks in the Pentagon and State Department into helping to fight an unwinnable war in Indo-China. One might observe here that Kennedy’s post-Bay of Pigs conversion to scepticism as regards the quality of advice he received from the CIA and military was most fortunate from the British point of view.
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Notes
Castle, T. N., At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955–1975 ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1993 ), pp. 11–12.
Dommen, A. J., ‘Lao Nationalism and American Policy, 1954–9’, in Zasloff, J. J., and Unger, L., Laos: Beyond the Revolution ( Basingstoke: Macmillan — now Palgrave Macmillan, 1991 ), p. 254.
Toye, H., Laos: Buffer State or Battleground ( London: OUP, 1968 ), p. 147.
Usowski, P. S., ‘Intelligence Estimates and US Policy toward Laos, 1960–63’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1991, pp. 371, 374;
Hilsman, R., To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy ( Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967 ), p. 116; de Zulueta to Macmillan, ‘Laos’, 26 August 1960, PREM11/2961.
Clifford, C., Counsel to the President: A Memoir ( New York: Anchor Books, 1992 ), p. 342–4. The emphasis in Robert McNamara’s version of the meeting is more on Eisenhower’s uncertainty as to the proper course of action in Laos (In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 35–7).
Warner, G., ‘President Kennedy and Indochina: the 1961 decisions’, International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4, 1994, p. 687; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 23 January 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XXIV, pp. 26–7.
Rostow to Kennedy, 10 March 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol_ XXIV, p. 83. Rostow makes reference to a meeting on 9 March, the record of which is still classified (ibid, p. 80). See also Rostow, W.W., The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History ( New York: Macmillan–now Palgrave Macmillan, 1972 ), pp. 266–7.
Usowski, ‘Intelligence Estimates and US Policy toward Laos’, pp. 376–7; Beschloss, M., Kennedy versus Khrushchev: The Crisis Years, 1960–3 ( New York: Faber and Faber, 1991 ), p. 161; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, pp. 35–6; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, p. 702.
Hall, D. K., ‘The Laos Crisis of 1961–1962: Coercive Diplomacy for Minimal Objectives’, in George, A. L., and Simons, W. E., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy ( 2nd edn., Boulder: Westview Press, 1994 ), pp. 101–2.
There is some controversy about what actually took place at Nam Tha. For a range of different opinions see Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, p. 45; Stevenson, The End of Nowhere, p. 174; Toye, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground, pp. 182, 196; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 141;
Dommen, A. J., Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization ( London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1964 ), pp. 217–18.
Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev, pp. 396–7; Memorandum for the Record, 10 May 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XXIV, pp. 734–5. The somewhat chaotic decision-making process in Washington during the period 10–12 May 1962 is described in Peltz, S. E., ‘“When Do I Have Time to Think?” John F. Kennedy, Roger Hilsman, and the Laotian Crisis of 1962’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1979, pp. 215–29. For Hilsman’s own account see To Move a Nation, pp. 143–6.
Darby, P., British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 ( London: OUP, 1973 ), pp. 228–30.
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© 2002 Nigel Ashton
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Ashton, N.J. (2002). The Laotian Crisis. In: Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War. Contemporary History in Context. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230800014_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230800014_2
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