Abstract
The implosion of an asset price bubble always leads to the discovery of fraud and swindles. Enron began its tumble into bankruptcy within a few months of the peak in US stock prices. At about the same time MCIWorldCom began a series of announcements about some financial accounting mishaps that eventually culminated in the largest bankruptcy ever; the firm had overstated investments and understated expenses by $10 billion. The junk bond market collapsed after the increase in interest rates toward the end of the 1980s and the sharp decline in stock prices in October 1987.
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Frauds, Swindles, and the Credit Cycle
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Kindleberger, C.P., Aliber, R.Z. (2005). Frauds, Swindles, and the Credit Cycle. In: Manias, Panics and Crashes. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230628045_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230628045_9
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