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The New Governance in Monetary Policy: A Critical Appraisal of the Fed and the ECB

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Aspects of Modern Monetary and Macroeconomic Policies

Abstract

Over the course of the last fifty years, four monetary policy regimes succeeded each other. A particular view of governance corresponds to each monetary policy regime. First, until 1974, for the Keynesian regime founded on the Keynesian synthesis, the government exercised direct management of economic policy. During this time, monetary policy was only one element of the global policy and under the full discretion of the government.

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Authors
  1. Edwin Le Heron
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, University of Cambridge, UK

    Philip Arestis (Professor and University Director of Research) (Professor and University Director of Research)

  2. Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK), Hans Boeckler Foundation, Duesseldorf, Germany

    Eckhard Hein (Senior Researcher, Visiting Professor) (Senior Researcher, Visiting Professor)

  3. Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Germany

    Eckhard Hein (Senior Researcher, Visiting Professor) (Senior Researcher, Visiting Professor)

  4. ‘Maître de Conférences’ in Economics, Sciences Po Bordeaux, France

    Edwin Le Heron (Researcher) (Researcher)

  5. SPIRIT (Science de Politique, Relations International et Territoire), France

    Edwin Le Heron (Researcher) (Researcher)

Copyright information

© 2007 Edwin Le Heron

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Le Heron, E. (2007). The New Governance in Monetary Policy: A Critical Appraisal of the Fed and the ECB. In: Arestis, P., Hein, E., Le Heron, E. (eds) Aspects of Modern Monetary and Macroeconomic Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230627345_9

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