Abstract
The bounded rationality programme views the economy as a society of intuitive statisticians. The key for the success of this programme is the existence of a ‘tight enough’ theory of statistical inference. We have so far shown that there is no entirely data-driven algorithm that receives a finite sample of data and yields the model that best approximates the process generating the data. Learning an interpretable model of a choice situation requires starting with a parametric probability model. To analyse the programme further, we now examine the possibility of a ‘tight enough’ theory of learning within the general framework of the Bayesian theory, which is primarily a theory of parametric inference.
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© 2007 Reza Salehnejad
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Salehnejad, R. (2007). ‘Homo economicus’ as an intuitive statistician (2): Bayesian diagnostic learning. In: Rationality, bounded rationality and microfoundations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625150_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230625150_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-28149-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-62515-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)