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The State as an “Expropriating” Concentrated Owner in China

  • Mariko Watanabe
Chapter
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Part of the IDE-JETRO book series (IDE)

Abstract

Under the gradualist transition process in Asian post-planned economies, the state sector still retains its control over economic activity. It may be the case that this helped to prevent a collapse of institutions which has facilitated a secure economic transition to date. However, whether this state-owned market economy will be sustainable in the future is another question. These economies, particularly in China which has the longest history of transition and has not yet completed its reforms, are encountering another problem: when and how will the state withdraw from economic life? So far, whether the state should exit or not has not been seriously addressed in the context of evaluating the gradual/shock transition process. It is this question that we will consider here.

Keywords

Corporate Governance Ordinary Little Square Total Asset Balance Sheet Trade Credit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), JETRO 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mariko Watanabe

There are no affiliations available

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