Al Qaeda’s Modus Operandi: Anticipating Their Target Selection

  • Barry R. Schneider


The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on “The Terrorist threat to the U.S. Homeland” states that:

We assess that Al Qaeda’s homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic dest r uction, signif icant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the U.S. population.1


Nuclear Weapon Critical Infrastructure Mass Destruction Biological Weapon Terrorist Threat 
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Copyright information

© Michael T. Kindt, Jerrold M. Post, and Barry R. Schneider 2009

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  • Barry R. Schneider

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