The Anti-Russian Lobby

Abstract

This chapter formulates a theory of Russophobia and the anti-Russian lobby’s influence on the U.S. Russia policy. I discuss the Lobby’s objectives, its tactics to achieve them, the history of its formation and rise to prominence, and the conditions that preserved its influence in the aftermath of 9/11. I argue that Russophobia has been important to American hegemonic elites in pressuring Russia for economic and political concessions in the post—Cold War era.

When the facile optimism was disappointed, Western euphoria faded, and Russophobia returned … The new Russophobia was expressed not by the governments, but in the statements of out-of-office politicians, the publications of academic experts, the sensational writings of journalists, and the products of the entertainment industry.

(Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River, 2002)¹

Russophobia is not a myth, not an invention of the Red-Browns, but a real phenomenon of political thought in the main political think tanks in the West … [T]he Yeltsin-Kozyrev’s pro-U.S. “giveaway game” was approved across the ocean. There is reason to say that the period in question left the West with the illusion that Russia’s role was to serve Washington’s interests and that it would remain such in the future.

(Sergei Mikoyan, International Affairs [October 2006])²