Abstract
Corporatism has been described as an exchange based on an interplay between inducements and constraints, both of which are mechanisms used to influence behavior and achieve control.1 If inducements are offered to produce compliance by the granting of advantages, constraints produce compliance by the application or threat of “disadvantages” or negative sanctions. The particular combination of inducements and constraints determines the resulting type of corporatism and the mix of control, representation, and mobilization. A critical factor explaining the Mexican regime’s ability to retain the loyalty of workers while restructuring in the 1990s is the type of inducements employed; inducements in the form of welfare benefits and subsidies are less likely to induce loyalty (particularly when austerity measures are retrenching these benefits) than inducements that offer career incentives, channels for representation and the expression of grievances, and input in policymaking.
A regime without parties is of necessity a conservative regime.
—Maurice Duverger, Les Parties Politiques (1954)
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Notes
See David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, “Who Does What, to Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin American Corporatism,” in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin Americ, ed. James Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977).
Howeida Adly, al-Ummal wa al-Siyyas (Cairo: Ahali, 1993); Marsha Posusney, Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructurin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Association Life in Twentieth-Century Egyp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Peter J. Williamson, Corporatism in Perspective: An Introdutory Guide to Corporatist Theory London: Sage, 1989), 39.
See Luis Javier Garrido, El partido de la revolucion institucionalizada: La formacion del nuevo estado en Mexico, 1928–194 (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1984).
See Mark Thompson and Ian Roxborough, “Union Elections and Democracy in Mexico: A Comparative Perspective,” British Journal of Industrial Relation 20, no. 2( July): 201–17.
Roberto Newell and Luis Rubio, Mexic’s Dilemma: The Political Origins of Economic Crisi (Westview, 1984), 121.
Miguel Angel Centeno, Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexic (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 33.
Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egyp (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 45.
See Rami Ginat, Egyp’s Incomplete Revolution: Lutfi al-Khuli and Nasse’s Socialism in the 1960 (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
Paul A. Cammack, “Strong States, Weak States, and Third World Development,” Manchester Papers in Politic (Victoria University of Manchester, Department of Government, September 1992), 24.
Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Reemergence of the Wafd Party: Glimpses of the Liberal Opposition,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studie 1984: 99–121.
Yahya Sadowski, Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agricultur (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), 31.
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© 2009 Hishaam D. Aidi
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Aidi, H.D. (2009). The Institutional Legacies of Incorporation. In: Redeploying the State. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230617902_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230617902_4
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