Reproducing Unequal Security: Peru as a Wellbeing Regime

Abstract

The main purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of the wider institutional landscape within which poor and marginalized people in Peru have to negotiate their livelihoods and forge some sense of wellbeing. The chapter thereby aims to provide a country-level counterpoint to the richer but more microanalysis presented in the other chapters.² In so doing, we also explore the extent to which lower level welfare arrangements can be regarded as autonomous from national institutions of market and state. Starting with those who rely primarily on rural livelihoods, then three livelihood strengthening options can be distinguished, corresponding to Hirschman’s (1970) distinction between “exit, voice and loyalty.” Migration is often a problematic escape into equally harsh and contested terrain for negotiating an alternative livelihood. Voice includes engaging in localized collective action and protest with an uncertain payoff. And loyalty often amounts to unreliable dependency on the patronage of monopoly employers, landlords, political brokers, richer relatives, NGO, and government. Many families combine all three options, with outcomes made more uncertain and unequal by Peru’s insertion into the global economy through mining, export crops, tourism, and international migration.

We are grateful for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter by other WeD researchers as well as Carlos Eduardo Aramburú, Patricia Ruiz Bravo, Augusto Castro, Mary Claux, Sergio Gamarra, Jane Henrici, Rosa Mendoza, David Sanchez Marin, Carolina Trivelli, Maria Balarin, Katie Wright-Revolledo, Diego Sanchez, Fernando Filgueira, Rubén M. Lo Vuolo, Juliana Martiinez Franzoni, and Des Gasper.