Abstract
Since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons have become one of the defining elements shaping the world strategic situation—for better or worse. The end of the cold war has again led to dramatic changes in the world’s security landscape. The international community, however, continues to grapple with many vital security issues involving nuclear weapons. The success or failure in dealing with these issues will greatly impact the threat perceptions and security policies of major powers as well as the future strategic stability of the world.
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Notes
The article is based on a couple of my previous papers, namely, “Reflections on the Rationale of Rebuilding the Global Strategic Stability” (in Chinese), International Studies, no. 4, Chinese Institute for International Studies (2002); and “Nuclear Nonproliferation-Past, Present and Future,” Research and Progress on Arms Control, China’s Association for Arms Control and Disarmament 3, no. 1 (2005). Views expressed in the present article are entirely of the author’s, and do not necessarily represent the position of any organizations or any other individuals.
Wang Zhongchun and Wen Zhonghua, “The Un-dissipated Nuclear Clouds” (in Chinese), (Beijing: NDU Publishing House, 2000), 111–113.
According to the estimate of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, in the early 1970s the United States deployed 294 ICBMs, 155 SLBMs, and 600 strategic bombers; the Soviet Union deployed 75 ICBMs, 75 SLBMs, and 190 strategic bombers. Ibid., 75.
These treaties include “Antarctic Treaty” in 1959, “Limited Test Ban Treaty” in 1963, “Outer Space Treaty” and “Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty” in 1967, “Seabed Arms Control Treaty” in 1971, and other nuclear weapons-free zone treaties. See A Concise Guide to World Armaments and Disarmament, ed. China Institute for Strategic Studies (Beijing, PRC: Military Translation Press, October 1986), 72–77.
See Darryl Howlett, “New Concepts of Deterrence: International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses,” Occasional Paper No. 5, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, March 2001, 19–20.
Tang Jiaoxun, at the Opening Ceremony of International Conference on A Disarmament Agenda for the twenty-first Century, sponsored by the United Nations and the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, April 2, 2002.
Camille Grand, “Ballistic Missile Threats, Missile Defenses, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability,” from International Perspectives on Missile Proliferation and Defenses, Occasional Paper No. 5, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Mountbatten Center for International Studies, March 2001, 6.
According to one estimate, in January 2001 the United States had deployed 9,376 operational nuclear warheads and 5,000 nonoperational nuclear warheads ; Russia deployed 9196 operational nuclear warheads and 13,500 nonoperational nuclear warheads. See Hans M. Kristensen, “The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit,” Arms Control Today (December 2001) 8–12.
For the detailed description of these armed conflicts, see SIPRI Yearbooks in the 1990s, especially the sections on Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security.
See Charles E. Morrison, “Globalization, Vulnerability and Adjustment”, paper presented to The Pacific Forum, CSIS, August 19, 2000. Morrison pointed out that “(i)t is widely argued that globalization increases economic disparities between those better able to take advantage of globalizing forces and those unprepared for it. The relative income gaps between and within countries are widening. The income ratio of the richest fifth of the world’s population and its poorest fifth have increased from 30 to 1 in 1960, to 60 to 1 in 1990, and 74 to 1 by 1997.”
See Zhu Yangming, Asia-Pacific Security Strategy (Beijing: The Military Science Publishing House, 2000), 181–182.
See Paul Stares “‘New’ Or ‘Non-Traditional’ Challenges,” April 2002, available at www.unu.edu/millennium/stares.pdf. Accessed on February 22, 2008. Stares said, “the range of conceivable security concerns broaden dramatically—some would argue limitlessly—to include a host of economic, social, political, environmental, and epidemiological problems. Whether they emanate from outside or inside the boundaries of the state is immaterial to their consideration as security threats. Likewise, whether they are the product of the deliberate or inadvertent acts is irrelevant. The harmful impact on the individual or the surrounding ecosystem is what matters. What makes problem ‘new’ or ‘non-traditional’ threats, therefore, is not that they are truly phenomena or products but rather that they are now treated as security concerns.”
For more details of China’s security perspective, see “China’s National Defense in 2004,” State Council Information Office, Beijing, December27, 2004, available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm. Accessed on February 22, 2008.
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© 2008 Christopher P. Twomey
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Pan Zhenqiang, M.G. (2008). The Changing Strategic Context of Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the new Nuclear World Order. In: Twomey, C.P. (eds) Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230613164_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230613164_4
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