Conclusion

Abstract

This analysis draws upon the prior theoretical insights of Evans, Migdal, Skocpol, and others to suggest that the manner in which the state is embedded in civil society—and the policies it adopts as a result—shapes the political opportunity structure for competing segments of the population. As the Chilean case illustrates, the state is reflective of conflicts and competing interests within civil society and also seeks to shape and manage the development and expressions of these interests through its policies and institutional mechanisms of control. The adoption and perpetuation of a neoliberal economic model in Chile, and the changes in state structure and policies that have accompanied it, have greatly enhanced the economic and political leverage of business elites in Chile while simultaneously erecting substantial impediments to popular sector collective action. Indeed, the transition from statism to neoliberalism in Chile has been characterized by structural and institutional reforms that have subjected the popular sectors to increasing degrees of commodification and stratification. Accordingly, this analysis contradicts the assumption prevalent in much of the political economy literature and promoted by advocates of market-oriented reform that the state under a market-based economy plays a minimal, if not neutral, role in structuring economic and political opportunities.