South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia in the 1980s

Abstract

The most common explanation for the foreign policy of a small or middle-ranked state during the cold war rests on the concept of power: powerful states secure the compliance of small states through the use of coercion as well as rewards.¹ David Vital explains that since there is a disparity of military strength between the great and small powers, it is inevitable for the latter to sacrifice their autonomy in making foreign policy. Most realist scholars share Vital’s view that “conflict with a great power is ultimately a conflict over autonomy,”² but there is a tendency to underestimate the possibility of a small state being able to shape its own policy independent of external pressure. The basic assumption on the capabilities of small states was not changed by neorealists during the 1980s, who also treated systemic conditions as the fundamental determinant of their behavior and tended to neglect the impact of domestic sociopolitical structure upon the foreign policymaking process and the role of top leaders in making strategic choices.