Formalism and Commitment in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Development

  • Yu Xingzhong


Constitutional formalism stresses the formal aspects of constitutionalism, such as constitutional rules, procedures, and conventions and not the substantive aspects of constitutionalism, such as constitutional ideals, values, and principles. The pedigree thesis of legal positivism, a well-known jurisprudential perspective, sees the validity of legal rules purely in terms of the source of power and holds that the ultimate criterion in a legal system resides only in the explicitly articulated power system or rule system within a given jurisdiction.1


Central Authority Chinese Communist Party Constitutional Formalism Legal Positivism Judicial Independence 
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Copyright information

© Hualing Fu, Lison Harris, and Simon N. M. Young, eds. 2007

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  • Yu Xingzhong

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