Abstract
Whether we champion the concept of a free market (liberal) international political economy or have sympathy for the necessity of states to protect their interests through a neomerchantalist philosophy, this text illustrates that all states in some circumstances act on the basis of perceived national interests. Clearly, we have seen this principle in action in each of the substantive chapters. We have seen how the interest of states led first to the creation of the GATT, to its expansion, and finally to its metamorphosis into the WTO. The WTO may champion free trade liberalism in the international marketplace, but it remains a creature of member interests. We noticed this in the consensus decision-making processes encouraged by and mostly used by the WTO. Each state is afraid that others may use the WTO to trample its interests; consensus keeps this from happening. Clumsy or not, in essence, every member can veto a decision that is harmful to its interests. Size and complexity may intervene in the coming rounds of negotiations to mitigate this principle with decisions made by hypermajorities. But it will not be easy to get the major states to surrender dominance in the processes of the organization.
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© 2007 Kevin Buterbaugh
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Buterbaugh, K., Fulton, R. (2007). Conclusions. In: The WTO Primer. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230610309_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230610309_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-60021-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-61030-9
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