Despite its typical association with great powers and Middle Eastern politics, the RMA is a global phenomenon with clear manifestations in the Americas. As we observed in Chapter 1, the RMA is very much a work in progress, though its features are becoming clearer. This rupture has entailed asymmetric conflict, complexity, new forms of organization, the use of ultra-surveillance, a variety of themes linked to a globalized political economy, as well as epistemological considerations. This chapter will address how various elements of the RMA have worked together in a synergetic fashion to explain strategic change in Colombia and Mexico.


Civil Society Social Force Identity Politics Strategic Change Global Civil Society 
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    See Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Boston: Shambhala, 1991), p. 49.Google Scholar
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© James F. Rochlin 2007

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