Introduction

Abstract

In the eighteen months after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, some American and British policy makers advocated invading Iraq regardless of whether the broader international community supported such an act. Some advocated doing so only with approval of the United Nations (UN). Some advocated intense international pressure via the UN to make Saddam Hussein allow UN inspections of weapons arsenals and manufacturing plants. And some argued that no military-oriented action against Iraq was necessary. They argued that since Iraq was a minor irritant to Western security interests, attention should be focused on the real threats like Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and North Korea’s nuclear program. How would someone in 2001 or 2002 know which policy is best for U.S. and Western security? Within a few years many of the predictions that poitical leaders made were shown to have been dazzlingly wrong. Secretary Rumsfeld said in April 2003 that American troops would be reduced by 75 percent within six months; President Bush said that the United States would uncover caches of illegal weapons and facilities producing them. Leaders are often wrong.