Abstract
In the spring of 2005, most Americans got a rude shock. Private Chinese firms bought two staples of the U.S. economy, IBM’s personal computer business and the Maytag appliance company.1 If there was any further need to announce the arrival of China’s economic power on the world stage, it was evident when a Chinese government-controlled company, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), made a bid of $18.5 billion to buy an American oil company, Unocal. In addition to the size of the bid, it was clear that the Chinese government was giving notice that it would use its leverage to trump a lower bid for Unocal, made by Chevron-Texaco, one of the four largest oil companies in the world.2 Although the Chinese government ultimately withdrew the bid, this episode was a wake-up call demonstrating that China’s massive foreign exchange reserves give it the potential to compete actively for the natural resources and technology that it seeks.
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Notes
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© 2007 David B.H. Denoon
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Denoon, D.B.H. (2007). Overview. In: The Economic and Strategic Rise of China and India. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230606869_1
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