Abstract
During the past two decades the discussions on world order have taken interesting turns. The collapse of the cold war constellation gave neoliberal visions of accelerating economic integration and global democratization a certain prominence within academic circles and a wider public sphere. For many observers the fall of the Berlin Wall and the removal of the iron curtain signified a future with the potential to grow into an era characterized by free trade, migration, and an ever-more tightly knit web of human interaction. Many deemed ideological fault lines and geopolitical rivalries to be outdated by the potentials that a new era of globalization brought to the international community. It was this optimistic branch of the late 1980s and early 1990s that brought widespread public attention to new programmatic terms ranging from “global village” to the “end of history” first and foremost in the United States but also in other parts of the world.1 At that time a majority of Chinese intellectuals, for example, supported a new “Enlightenment” effort, widespread Westernization and internationalization programs for their society.2 And in most countries of the former Warsaw Pact, liberal democratic parties won national elections—public endorsements to bring their societies closer to a more Western and more global world.3
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Notes
See, for example, Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999 );
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man ( New York: Avon, 1993 ).
See, for example, Jing Wang, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996 ).
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See, for example, Richard A. Falk, The Declining World Order: America’s Imperial Geopolitics ( New York: Routledge, 2004 ).
About Islamic fundamentalism and its modern character see for example Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: Fundamentalism, De-territorialisation and the Search for a New Ummah ( London: Hurst, 2004 ).
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See, for example, Michael Lienesch, Redeeming America: Piety and Politics in the New Christian Right ( Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993 ).
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An example are the lively debates initiated by the rather apologetic account in Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power ( New York: Basic Books, 2003 ).
See, for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000 ). A slightly more optimistic account, which places some hope on the global elites’ interest for international stability, is offered by
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Most prominently by Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951); as well as
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See Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 ), pp. 25–27.
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An argument made by Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998 ).
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For this reason the concept of colonial modernity has gained a certain prominence in recent years. See, for example, Tani E. Barlow, ed., Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia ( Durham: Duke University Press, 1997 ).
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For the liberal tradition in Latin America, see for example Richard N. Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855–1876: A Study in Liberal Nation-Building ( Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979 );
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See Douglas Howland, Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in 19th Century Japan ( Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002 ).
See Paula Harrell, Sowing the Seeds of Change: Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, 1895–1905 ( Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992 ).
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Quoted from Matthias Dörries, “Krakatau 1883: Die Welt als Labor und Erfahrungsraum,” in Iris Schröder and Sabine Hohler, eds., Welt-Räume: Geschichte, Geographie und Globalisierung seit 1900 ( Frankfurt: Campus, 2005 ), p. 68.
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Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth-Century On-Line Pioneers ( New York: Walker and Co., 1998 ).
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Paul Greenhalgh, Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World’s Fairs, 1851–1939 ( Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988 ).
See Carlos Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982 ), p. 107.
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See Cemil Aydin, Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia. Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan -Asian Thought (1882–1945) ( New York: Columbia University Press, 2007 ).
Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992 ).
See, from an economic point of view, Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973 );
Dietmar Rothermund, The Global Impact of the Great Depression 1929–1939 ( London: Routledge, 1996 ).
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© 2007 Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier
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Conrad, S., Sachsenmaier, D. (2007). Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s. In: Conrad, S., Sachsenmaier, D. (eds) Competing Visions of World Order. Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230604285_1
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