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Offensive Advantage in a Unipolar System

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Abstract

While the unipolar power may be unduly complacent in a world of defensive advantage, its actions move to the other extreme if it perceives offensive advantage. If other actors can easily damage its power, then it must act forcefully to stop that threat. If it can use its own power cheaply, then the unipolar power is likely to engage in frequent conflict, wars it expects to win quickly and easily. This chapter completes our theory of international politics in a unipolar era by developing and evaluating a hypothesis of unipolar behavior during times of mutual offensive advantage.

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Chapter 8

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© 2007 Thomas S. Mowle, David H. Sacko

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Mowle, T.S., Sacko, D.H. (2007). Offensive Advantage in a Unipolar System. In: The Unipolar World. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230603073_8

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