Abstract
While stability is a property of the international system as a whole, system-level effects result from the combined actions of the states that constitute it. System stability indicates that states are not going to war against each other as often as in other systems and that they are not joining existing conflicts as often as they might Wars and conflicts often arise in the context of balancing, as states try to enhance their power while blocking other states’ power. States may also join conflicts because they are trying to balance the possible winner, prolonging the war. The relatively low intensity of conflicts in the unipolar era suggests that when states do join conflicts, it is to bandwagon with the likely winner and to share in its gains. This chapter develops and evaluates a hypothesis that states are more likely to bandwagon with the unipolar power than to balance against it.
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Chapter 4
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© 2007 Thomas S. Mowle, David H. Sacko
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Mowle, T.S., Sacko, D.H. (2007). Balancing and Bandwagoning in a Unipolar System. In: The Unipolar World. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230603073_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230603073_4
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