The Logic of Surprise versus the Logic of Surprise Avoidance

Abstract

A strategy of surprise is the result of calculated decisions made prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It entails the deliberate attempt by one actor to prevent his potential victim from learning beforehand what is being schemed against him.¹ The would-be surpriser can attain surprise in several ways. Whenever possible, he will attempt to disguise both his intention and rationale; that is, he will try to prevent his potential victim from learning what he wants to do and why. Moreover, he may try to conceal his state’s true aggregate economic and military strength, and the type, size, location, movement, and readiness of his military forces. Coupled with these dimensions, he may attempt to disguise the military doctrine that will guide the operation. And, whenever possible, a would-be surpriser will make an effort to prevent his potential victim from learning that he is the target and when he will be attacked.²

Saddam Hussein was being very deliberate … armored units could not more vividly advertise their intent. It was as if a gun had been loaded and aimed, and a finger put on the trigger.

—Walter P. Lang

It looked like bluster, it looked like an armed threat really for the purpose of achieving some diplomatic or political objective, but it didn’t look like an invasion …

—Colin Powell

Zero hour is tomorrow.

How could one private person without the resources of a foreign government be such a threat?

—Senator David Boren