Why Peasants Adapt: Origins of Behavioral Change Under Yeltsin

  • Stephen K. Wegren


Why do peasants adapt and change their behavior? How do they react to external stimuli? An understanding of adaptation in rural orientations and behavior requires an examination of the factors that affect reform in general and the rural sector in particular. The analysis in this chapter sets the stage for understanding adaptive behavior by rural actors, a topic that is examined in subsequent chapters.


Export Price Shock Therapy World Market Price Rural Sector Soviet Period 
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© Stephen K. Wegren 2005

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  • Stephen K. Wegren

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