The President as King: The Usurpation of War and Foreign Affairs Powers in the Modern Age

  • David Gray Adler
Part of the The Evolving American Presidency Series book series (EAP)


Monarchical conceptions of power in seventeenth-century England, anchored in the theory of High Prerogative, were characterized by sweeping claims to illimitable authority in matters of foreign and domestic affairs. Stuart kings, principally James I and Charles I, also adduced the Divine Right of Kingship as justification for, among other things, unilateral authority to commence war, to formulate and conduct the nation’s foreign affairs, to withhold information from Parliament involving national security concerns, as well as the power to detain subjects and deny them the benefit of a judicial hearing. English kings also contended that the courts could not review their judgments and decisions in matters of state.


Foreign Policy Foreign Affair Bush Administration Geneva Convention Executive Power 
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Copyright information

© Michael A. Genovese and Lori Cox Han 2006

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  • David Gray Adler

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