Abstract
Following Bermuda, the voluntary organisations could only try to ensure that the Conference’s few recommendations were implemented and press the Allied Governments to issue further warnings of retribution for war crimes. The focus now shifted to post-war relief and reconstruction.1 With the invasion of Sicily well advanced, Rome liberated in June and the continued Soviet advance westward, the prospects of an Allied victory were increasing.
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Notes
FO 371/30917 C7870/61/18, 6 August 1942, Treatment of War Criminals; Fox, ‘The Jewish Factor in British War Crimes Policy in 1942’, English Historical Review, vol. XCII, no. 362 (January 1977), p. 98;
Priscilla Dale Jones, ‘British Policy towards German Crimes against German Jews, 1939–1945’, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, vol. XXXVI (1991), pp. 339–66. This became a major controversy in 1945, finally resolved in August 1945 with the establishment of a new legal category of ‘Crimes Against Humanity’. See Acc 3121 C11/7/2/9, 26 April 1945, Board to A. Greenwood.
Ibid. Nevertheless, see John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII (New York, 2000). Cornwell maintains that the Pope could never bring himself to publish a clear message of condemnation of the enormous crimes against Europe’s Jews and other minorities who were earmarked for physical extermination. Cornwell concludes that a forceful statement from Rome would have made a difference to the fate of European Jews. The least it would have done was to warn the Jews that deportation meant certain death, resulting in more feeing or going into hiding. Furthermore it would have encouraged greater willingness on the part of the Catholic populations to help their Jewish neighbours.
Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary, vol. 2 (New York, 1981), pp. 691–731;
Shlomo Aronson, ‘“The Quadruple Trap” and the Holocaust in Hungary’, David Cesarani, ed., Genocide and Rescue: The Holocaust in Hungary (Oxford, 1997), p. 94.
Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies (London, 1981), pp. 190–8, 231–9.
Braham, Jewish Leadership during the Nazi Era, pp. 1104–9; Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933–1945 (New Haven, 1994), pp. 172–95.
Dina Porat, The Blue and Yellow Stars of David: The Zionist Leadership in Palestine and the Holocaust, 1939–1945 (London, 1990), p. 216.
CZA S25/1678, cited in Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 326; Wasserstein, op. cit., 243. see also Theo Tshuy, Dangerous Diplomacy: The Story of Carl Lutz (Cambridge, 2001), for the lesser known but equally important role played by the Swiss diplomat in wartime Budapest in securing protective papers for thousands of Jews in Hungary.
FO 371/42815 WR 752/3/48, 9 August 1944, Rathbone to Eden; See Randolph L. Braham, ‘The Rescue of the Jews of Hungary in Historical Perspective’, Proceedings of the Fifth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, Jerusalem, March 1983 (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 465–6.
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© 2002 Pamela Shatzkes
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Shatzkes, P. (2002). Pawns in the Game of War (Summer 1943–Autumn 1944). In: Holocaust and Rescue. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230598416_8
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