Anglo-Jewry Mobilises (Summer 1942–Spring 1943)

Abstract

Recent criticism of Anglo-Jewry’s wartime record has focused almost exclusively on the question of whether sufficient effort was made on behalf of European Jewry. However, analysis of the effort itself has been hitherto lacking, the assumption being that what mattered was the will to achieve results rather than the ingenuity or practicality of individual endeavours. Notwithstanding the desperation and good intentions of the organisations, an element of naïveté and shorttermism characterised much of their approach. This inevitably doomed their efforts to failure because, understandably, their exclusive focus on the Jewish tragedy, particularly after the summer of 1942, failed to take account of the wider political and military context within which it took place. The Anglo-Jewish leadership appeared unable to understand the dynamics of global war and incapable of comprehending the subtle and complex calculation with which officials treated its requests. The government was committed to a long-term strategy for winning the war whatever the unavoidable human cost; the organisations, by contrast, took the view that immediate rescue must take precedence. The official documents of this period reveal the government’s politely concealed impatience at the narrow-minded naïveté of the Jewish organisations, which were sagely offering diplomatically phrased advice on aspects of the conduct of war without regard to logistics or possible consequences.