Abstract
A lie is defined here as a statement intended to deceive others. Telling a lie is not simply the opposite of telling the truth because telling the truth and being truthful are not the same thing. Nor is saying what is false necessarily to deceive. To see this, we need to distinguish between truth and falsity, truthfulness and deception (Bok, 1978, 6–13). Questions about truth and falsity belong to the ontological and epistemological domain and involve questions about what is the case and how or if it can be known to us. A statement is true or false if what is said to be corresponds to what actually exists or is. Questions about truthfulness and deception belong to the moral domain of intention. Someone is being truthful when what they say, they believe to be true. If they intend to deceive, they are not being truthful – they are lying. They say something they believe to be false (or not true) with the intention that someone else should believe it to be true. The liar pretends that circumstances are other than they are.
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© 2000 Maureen Ramsay
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Ramsay, M. (2000). Justifications for Lying in Politics. In: The Politics of Lying. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597846_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597846_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40375-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59784-6
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