Abstract
The transaction costs (TC) paradigm offers a general framework for examining the choice of policy instruments and/or regimes for the management of resources and economic entities. The most fundamental unit of analysis in the economics of organization theory is the transaction. The TC paradigm enables articulation and choice of organizations geared to meet stated objectives.
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© 2003 Krishna Rao Pinninti
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Rao, P.K. (2003). Organizations Theory. In: The Economics of Transaction Costs. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597686_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597686_8
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