Conclusion

Abstract

In the last eight chapters, I have made the case for ethical intuitionism by rebutting the alternative theories and then responding to all the major objections to intuitionism. In essence, I have argued:

• 1. There are five broad views about the nature of morality: non-cognitivism, subjectivism, naturalism, nihilism, and intuitionism.

• 2. Non-cognitivism, subjectivism, naturalism, and nihilism all face grave difficulties.

• 3. Intuitionism faces no serious problems.

• 4. Therefore, intuitionism is probably the correct view.

But the arguments establishing points (2) and (3) have been long and complex. In this chapter, I provide a brief review of the most important arguments for these theses. I then discuss why intuitionism has been unpopular, and why the issue is important. I conclude with some remarks about how I became an intuitionist.