Abstract
In the last three chapters, I have addressed three of the most prominent objections to intuitionism, those concerned with intuitionism’s ability to account for moral knowledge, its ability to explain and resolve moral disagreement, and its ability to account for moral motivation. In this chapter, I address miscellaneous further objections.
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© 2005 Michael Huemer
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Huemer, M. (2005). Further Objections. In: Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597051_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597051_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-57374-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59705-1
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