Abstract
In the present chapter, I defend two main theses, as against the views of ethical reductionists: that at least some evaluative properties are irreducible, and that moral knowledge cannot be explained without appeal to ethical intuition.
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© 2005 Michael Huemer
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Huemer, M. (2005). Reductionism. In: Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597051_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230597051_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-57374-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59705-1
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