Power and Interdependence: the Firm’s Ability to Act
This book contends that a firm’s power and interdependence are key to understanding whether it is able to translate a desire not to cooperate into action. Why are some firms able to behave opportunistically or defect while others remain in alliances where their interests have clearly been ignored by their partners? For a firm that could be harmed by its partners’ actions, what can it do to prevent this undesirable action from taking place? Both the capability to act and to defend or deter depends on its power and its interdependence. But, just because a firm has the capability to behave opportunistically or defect does not mean that it will.
KeywordsSwitching Cost Strategic Alliance Dark Side Latent Power Resource Contribution
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