Argument from Epistemic Conservatism
It has been suggested that the stability of one’s belief system is a cognitive virtue, an end toward which cognitive agents should strive. While sticking dogmatically to one’s beliefs is epistemically preposterous, it would be equally unreasonable, it is said, to change them in the absence of any good reasons. This position known as epistemic conservatism seems to have had a distinguished line of advocates among the likes of Quine and Chisholm. Although, it has been claimed that epistemic conservatism has informed and resolved various positions and problems in epistemology from foundationalist theories of justification to problems such as the underdetermination of theories by data, one can primarily regard it as an anti-skeptical strategy whose most widely held form upholds that the mere holding of a belief confers justification on that belief.
KeywordsBelief Revision Epistemic Justification Conservative Principle Belief Ascription Coherence Theory
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