Universalizability and Closure

  • Hamid Vahid


Suppose I claim that it will rain today basing my belief on such body of evidence as the gathering clouds, the increasingly windy weather, and so on. Do I know this? It seems so. However, the skeptic is quick to remind us of relevantly similar circumstances in which I had formed a similar belief based on similar grounds but my claim had turned out to be false. Thus, he would demand that unless I can show that my current situation is not a knowledge-precluding one, I will not be able to claim to know that it will rain today. This argument admittedly requires some filling up as we need to have a more precise account of the mechanism through which knowledge-precluding situations, namely, possibilities that have to be ruled out if a claim is to count as knowledge, can be specified.


Epistemic Status Epistemic Justification Universalizability Principle Epistemic Context Epistemic Luck 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Hamid Vahid 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hamid Vahid
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Fundamental Sciences (IPM)Iran

Personalised recommendations