Universalizability and Closure
Suppose I claim that it will rain today basing my belief on such body of evidence as the gathering clouds, the increasingly windy weather, and so on. Do I know this? It seems so. However, the skeptic is quick to remind us of relevantly similar circumstances in which I had formed a similar belief based on similar grounds but my claim had turned out to be false. Thus, he would demand that unless I can show that my current situation is not a knowledge-precluding one, I will not be able to claim to know that it will rain today. This argument admittedly requires some filling up as we need to have a more precise account of the mechanism through which knowledge-precluding situations, namely, possibilities that have to be ruled out if a claim is to count as knowledge, can be specified.
KeywordsEpistemic Status Epistemic Justification Universalizability Principle Epistemic Context Epistemic Luck
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