The Deontological Conception of Justification

  • Hamid Vahid


In Chapter 1 we highlighted the two dimensions of perspective and truth conducivity that any adequate theory of epistemic justification should incorporate and be accountable to. We then discussed a number of well-known accounts of the nature of epistemic justification and found that, one way or another, they failed to respect and heed these constraints, thus, only compounding the confusion over the precise nature of epistemic justification. The increasing sophistication (often in an ad hoc manner) of current theories of justification and the ensuing disarray have prompted some theorists to deny its privileged place in epistemology, and redefine the debate in different terms (cf. my discussion of Alston in section 1.6; Plantinga 1993; Haack 1993). In this chapter, I shall try to articulate and defend one theory of justification (the so-called “deontological” conception) that, I claim, is able to accommodate the above concerns. Let us then begin by setting the stage for introducing the deontological conception of epistemic justification.


Justify Belief Epistemic Justification Adequate Evidence Doxastic Voluntarism Adequate Ground 
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Copyright information

© Hamid Vahid 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hamid Vahid
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute for Fundamental Sciences (IPM)Iran

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