Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Depending on our choice of the standards and goals (moral, practical, etc.) the evaluation will yield different results. Epistemic evaluation, however, involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. A theory of epistemic justification must therefore address the question of the aim and objective of epistemic justification, that is, what is the point of epistemic justification and why we value it. Although it is fair to say that the concept of epistemic justification has occupied the center stage in contemporary epistemological thought, the questions involving its own nature and characteristics are still very much matters of dispute. The situation has further been aggravated by the recent controversy over the internalist/externalist character of justification with both sides of the debate taking their cues from what they consider to be the nature of that concept. The increasing sophistication of current theories of epistemic justification and the ensuing disarray have prompted some theorists to deny its privileged place in epistemology, and redefine the debate in different terms.
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