Abstract
Chamberlain had questioned the widespread assumption that Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on 30 January would resolve these doubts and speculations one way or the other. His guess, if such it was, proved correct. The Fuhrer did boast of his triumphs to date and he did reiterate his arguments for the restitution of Germany’s former colonies, but he also stressed that such a problem could not be a cause of war. Nor did Germany have any other demands on Great Britain or France. He acknowledged the help of Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier in the matter of the Sudetenland, and hoped that the Czechs would not revert to the policies of Benes. He expressed satisfaction at Germany’s relations with Poland and lesser European states, all mentioned by name apart from Albania.1 His failure to mention the Soviet Union at all on this occasion amounted to a friendly gesture, given his past routine of denunciation. Foreign governments knew better than to take all this at face value, and the mood abroad of unease and uncertainty was not dispelled. His intentions were no clearer than before, but the speech was, at least, not obviously designed to prepare the German people for imminent war.
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Notes
N. Baynes, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 1922–1939 (1942) II, pp. 1567–78.
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© 2007 David Gillard
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Gillard, D. (2007). Continental Commitment. In: Appeasement in Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230595743_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230595743_6
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