Diplomacy by Drama

Abstract

On 3 October 1938, Sir Thomas Inskip had announced in the Commons that, although an international guarantee of Czechoslovakia was still to be negotiated, the British Government ‘would certainly feel bound to take all steps in their power’ to preserve that country’s integrity against ‘an act of unprovoked aggression’. Within six months, Czechoslovakia had suffered invasion and partition by neighbouring states. On 31 March 1939, Neville Chamberlain announced in the Commons that if, during the present diplomatic consultations, Poland’s armed forces had to resist an action threatening her independence, the British Government ‘would feel themselves obliged at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power’. Within six months, Poland had suffered invasion and partition by neighbouring states. Why had the men involved in the making of British policy come to believe that this second ‘guarantee’ would be a more effective deterrent than the first?