Abstract
This chapter deals with loan contracting from a private bank in Vietnam — the Asia Commercial Bank (ACB). Loan contracting forms part of the broader financial contaracting literature. The financial contracting literature has been developed from two influential papers by Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990). These papers discuss agency problems in situations where contracting is incomplete in the sense that some important future variables are difficult or impossible to describe initially and therefore must be left out of the contract. These variables are ex-post observable for the parties in a given contract, but are not verifiable for any third party. Financial contracting can be seen as an instrument to avoid or reduce agency problems of all kinds. The financial contracting literature deals with the optimal financial structure of firms, focusing on the entire set of characteristics of the different financial contracts that the firm is linked to.
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Trà, P.T.T., Lensink, R. (2008). The Determinants of Loan Contracts to Business Firms: Empirical Evidence from a Private Bank in Vietnam. In: Mavrotas, G. (eds) Domestic Resource Mobilization and Financial Development. Studies in Development Economics and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230594012_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230594012_10
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