On the Political Economy of Poverty Alleviation

  • Marcelo Côrtes Nerì
  • Marcelo Casal de Xerez


The management of social policy has become more complex and challenging than ever. The decentralization of public actions allied to the growing involvement of NGOs and private firms creates a widespread diversity of simultaneous actions. On the other hand, the internationalization process of economies, concomitant with contagious macroeconomic instabilities, broadens the scope of opportunities for the realization of transfers of resources and social technology between countries.


Local Government Federal Government Human Development Index United Nations Development Programme Participation Restriction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcelo Côrtes Nerì
  • Marcelo Casal de Xerez

There are no affiliations available

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