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Accountability in Development Finance Projects: Between the Market and a Soft Place

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Corruption and Development

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Development ((PSD))

Abstract

Development financed projects have a unique institutional context for the production of economic activities since accountability is enacted neither directly through the state nor the market. Most development finance institutions (DFIs) enjoy hybrid public-private status and weak lines of accountability to their underwriting Treasuries (Bracking, 2003). The market environment of DFI projects is also concessionary, without the accountability of competition, where often the participant companies are part of a small group of internationally networked enterprises, with close relations with contracting parties within the DFIs. This closed culture of large business enterprise is somewhat cronyistic, promoting a similar business culture in aid dependent countries, which resonates and reinforces historical and structural patterns of political economy in post-colonies (Bracking, 2006), often contributing to an enclave structure (see Mhone, 2001).

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© 2007 Sarah Bracking

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Bracking, S. (2007). Accountability in Development Finance Projects: Between the Market and a Soft Place. In: Bracking, S. (eds) Corruption and Development. Palgrave Studies in Development. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230590625_13

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