Abstract
According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all, their function being instead to express affective attitudes like desire or emotion and the like.
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© 2007 Hallvard Lillehammer
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Lillehammer, H. (2007). Value, Normativity and the Mind. In: Companions in Guilt. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230590380_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230590380_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-35823-6
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-59038-0
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