Abstract
Fallibilism has assumed the status of the default position in the contemporary theories of knowledge. Although it has been used to characterize belief or justified belief, it is fallibilism about knowledge that has been the central theme throughout the history of epistemological thought with theorists being in dispute with one another over the extension of fallible/infallible knowledge as well as ways of accommodating knowledge of necessary truths. Despite enjoying wide currency, however, there is surprisingly no consensus as to how the notion of fallibility is to be understood.
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© 2009 Hamid Vahid
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Vahid, H. (2009). Belief, Justification and Fallibility. In: The Epistemology of Belief. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584471_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584471_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-29960-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-58447-1
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