Belief, Interpretation and Moore’s Paradox

Abstract

Moore famously observed that there is something odd or defective about sentences of the form “P but I do not believe that P”, or <P & ∼IBP> for short, in that asserting them would be absurd. Although such sentences can be true they cannot be sensibly asserted. For example, while one may countenance situations where it is raining but one happens not to believe it, one cannot properly assert the corresponding sentence. It is absurd to assert that it is raining but then go on to deny that one believes that it is. Moore noted that such an oddity is equally present when one utters sentences of the form <P & IB∼P> (Moore 1942). We shall call such sentences “Moorean sentences”. There thus appears to be something odd or defective about them, and the question that has caught the attention of philosophers ever since is to explain what underlies their defective nature.