Abstract
In Chapter 3, we have placed the 2RS together with SMP and the alternative vote. This choice is justified by structural isomorphism, namely the same electoral formula and the same district magnitude. Isomorphism, however does not imply the same mechanics and outcomes, at least as far as the 2RS legislative version is concerned. Since the latter is the only relevant one for our purposes (i.e. testing Duverger’s propositions),1 the topic requires an extensive reassessment. In our opinion, indeed, the accounts provided so far by most of the literature are far from exhaustive or satisfying; and their failures concern the explanation of both the number and type of parties the system allows for, which are two crucial questions for any comparative study of the effects of electoral rules.
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Notes
Duverger’s generalization might be countered with the objection that it is based on just the French case, and that to assume that the shape of the party system is due to the 2RS method of election is unwarranted since ‘it is difficult to disentangle effects characteristic of France from those inherent in the [electoral] system itself’ (Birch, 2003b: 325). This may be so, but while we lack truly convincing explanations in terms of some feature of French ‘national character’, or political culture, the theoretical statement quoted in the text has raised such a large debate as to deserve further attention and systematic comparisons to crucial alternative generalizations put forward in the literature.
These parties’ dis-representation, Fisichella (2003: 333) maintains, ‘does not follow a linear trend’, though ‘the Radicals and other French centre-left groups have frequently scored a favourable record’. This example undoubtedly points to the excellent bargaining skills of the involved parties, but quite apart from it, Fisichella’s generalizing premise does suggest an outcome that, through ups and downs of under- and over-representation, could well end up in the medium-to-long term with much the same ‘non-excessive under-representation’ admitted by Sartori.
The first relevant remark one may think of is that a consolidated practice of electoral alliances secures a kind of ‘cohesive fragmentation’ within both left and right blocs, while PR makes for a much looser, or no, coordination. The crucial coordination agency, however, is surely the presidential institution: the top-two runoff method, the large discretional power accruing to the position, and the growing personalization of elections it allows for, have indeed maximized the bipolar structure of competition in legislative voting, have displaced the majorities’ centre of gravity from parties to the president, and, more recently, have started processes of concentration and electoral-political fusions that some believe might lead to ‘bipolar two-partyism’ (Grunberg and Haegel, 2007). Once again, then, we have to emphasize that our statements only apply to the effect of legislative 2RS and are, moreover, essentially retrospective statements; thus, they do not exclude more comprehensive, and more prospective, approaches.
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© 2009 Gianfranco Baldini and Adriano Pappalardo
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Baldini, G., Pappalardo, A. (2009). The French 2RS: Suited for Comparative Research?. In: Elections, Electoral Systems and Volatile Voters. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584389_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584389_7
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