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The Firm and its Governance over the Industry Life Cycle

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Powerful Finance and Innovation Trends in a High-Risk Economy

Abstract

Uniformity in modes of governance of the firm is now widely debated. So far, the predominant thesis was that there should be a superior model promoting optimality by disclosure of information and transparency. But today this thesis is greatly contested, since the adoption of a unique and universal set of rules and arrangements neglects the diversity and heterogeneity of firms, industries, as well as institutional contexts (Becht et al., 2005). Moreover, evidence shows that this unique model of governance tends to generate major failures and turbulence, especially in innovative industries (Fransman, 2002; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2002; Krafft and Ravix, 2005). What emerges as a result is that different types of rules and norms should govern differently entrepreneurial as well as public firms, depending on the industry in which they operate and the stage of development of this industry.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS-GREDEG, University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France

    Jackie Krafft (CNRS researcher in economics) & Jacques-Laurent Ravix (Professor of Economics)

Authors
  1. Jackie Krafft
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  2. Jacques-Laurent Ravix
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Research Unit on Industry and Innovation (Lab. RII), University of Littoral Côte d’Opale, France

    Blandine Laperche (Associate Professor, Research Director in Economics) & Dimitri Uzunidis (Director) (Associate Professor, Research Director in Economics) &  (Director)

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© 2008 Jackie Krafft and Jacques-Laurent Ravix

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Krafft, J., Ravix, JL. (2008). The Firm and its Governance over the Industry Life Cycle. In: Laperche, B., Uzunidis, D. (eds) Powerful Finance and Innovation Trends in a High-Risk Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584099_9

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