Testing Resistance to Change: The Erratic Imposition of Workfare at the Margins of French Society

Abstract

The French welfare system is often described as one of the most ‘immovable objects’ (Pierson, 1998: 558) among welfare states or as part of the ‘frozen continental landscape’ (Esping-Andersen, 1996). The prevalence of social insurance mechanisms in the administration of French social protection typically constrains the scope of welfare retrenchment at times of rising financial and ideological pressures on social security systems. Trade unions represent crucial veto players as they defend the rights of their clientele, thus accentuating political and ideological pressures on non-insured job seekers, especially minimum income recipients. However, institutional veto points do not alone account for the ability of French society to resist change.¹ Indeed, French political élites are divided on how to reform the social protection system. Even when political constraints are relatively weak, there is no technocratic agreement in relation to the ‘best solution’. Internal division is particularly accentuated among French Socialists, but is also pronounced within the current right-wing government. In this context, reform trajectories remain erratic and incremental. Governments implement institutional change through successive layering, that is by adding successive reforms and legislative programmes rather than replacing new ones (Palier, 2005).