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Abstract

Suppose that two drivers are approaching a crossroads. Each has a choice of two strategies: he can either slow down or maintain speed. If one slows down and the other maintains speed, both get safely through the crossroads and there is a slight delay to the driver who has slowed down. If they both slow down they reach the crossroads with the problem of priority still to be settled; I take it that this outcome is worse for both drivers than the one in which only one driver slows down. Worst of all, of course, is the outcome in which they both maintain speed. This game is a close relative of the banknote game of Chapter 2; games with this structure are sometimes called leader games (Rapoport, 1967).

Keywords

Stable Equilibrium Railway Station Major Road Deductive Reasoning Average Utility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Robert Sugden 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Sugden
    • 1
  1. 1.University of East AngliaUK

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