Abstract
The notion of spontaneous order can, I shall argue, best be understood by using the theory of games. In this chapter I shall explain how I intend to use this theory, illustrating my argument with a very simple game which provides a useful model of how social conventions might evolve.
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© 2005 Robert Sugden
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Sugden, R. (2005). Games. In: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230536791_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230536791_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40018-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-53679-1
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