Abstract
The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring peace to Europe. The euphoria did not last long. Ethnic nationalism exploded in many parts of Eastern Europe. War erupted in the former Yugoslavia in mid-1991. Then violent conflicts and civil war broke out in the disintegrating Soviet Union. Tensions developed between other states in the region, often over the treatment of ethnic minorities.
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Notes
Gabriel Munuera, Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience, Chaillot Paper 15/16 (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, 1994), p. 3.
There have been internal conflicts (Northern Ireland, the Basque country) and disputes between member states (over Gibraltar), but no inter-state violent conflicts.
A report by several research institutes asserted that ‘it is economic success or failure that will determine the fate of the new democracies.’ Falk Bomsdorf, et al., Confronting Insecurity in Eastern Europe: Challenges for the European Community (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 21.
‘EC-US Statement on Peaceful and Democratic Transformation in the East’, EPC press release P.111/91, 9 November 1991.
Jenonne Walker, ‘European Regional Organizations and Ethnic Conflict’, in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 45.
Jacques Delors, ‘European Unification and European Security’, in European Security after the Cold War Part I, Adelphi Paper no. 284 (London: Brassey’s, 1994), p. 11. 9. Delors, ‘European Unification’, p. 9.
Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg European Council, 28–9 June 1991, Annex V, EC Bulletin no. 6, 1991, p. 18.
Reinhardt Rummel, ‘The CFSP’s Conflict Prevention Policy’, in Martin Holland, ed., Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms (London: Pinter, 1997), p. 107.
See Renée de Nevers, ‘Democratization and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 1993. She suggests that to try to prevent ethnic conflict during democratization, the international community should emphasize the need to protect group rights (p. 46).
The Community had not insisted so much on minority rights before. The June 1991 Luxembourg European Council stressed ‘the need to protect human rights whether or not the persons concerned belong to minorities.’ Presidency Conclusions, Annex V, EC Bulletin no. 6, 1991, p. 17.
As Georg Sorensen argues in ‘Introduction’, in Sorensen, ed., Political Conditionality, p. 4.
See Lawrence Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Perspective’ and Geoffrey Pridham, ‘The Politics of the European Community, Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition in Southern Europe’, in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991).
This mirrors the clash between the economic containment and interdependence approaches discussed in Section 2.3. Both approaches concentrate on generating reform ‘from above’. But the revolutions of 1989 were driven ‘from below’. Timothy Garton Ash makes this point in relation to West Germany’s Ostpolitik, in Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, pp. 203–15.
Adrian Bridge, ‘Bulgaria Torn by Row Over Kremlin Alliance’, The Independent, 1 April 1996.
Bulgaria was also a problem case. Former communists had ruled Bulgaria since 1990; in December 1996, a reformist won the presidential elections. Following public protests about corruption and the poor state of the economy, parliamentary elections were held early, in April 1997 and resulted in a defeat for the ruling Socialist party. But Bulgaria’s relations with its neighbours have been relatively unproblematic. Official persecution of ethnic Turks ended with the toppling of the communist regime in November 1989; a good neighbour treaty was signed with Turkey in May 1992. Although Bulgaria does not acknowledge ‘Macedonian’ as a nationality, it was the first country to recognize FYROM (on 16 January 1992). The need for Western approval contributed to these developments.
Alfred Reisch, ‘Meciar and Slovakia’s Hungarian Minority’, RFEIRL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 43, 30 October 1992. From February 1992, the CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities sent observers to Slovakia (and Hungary, where there are an estimated 100,000 ethnic Slovaks). Munuera, PreventingArmed Conflict, p. 16.
Alfred Reisch, ‘The Difficult Search for a Hungarian-Slovak Accord’, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 42, 23 October 1992. Hungary’s attitude on the minorities issue has not always been constructive, particularly under the Antall government (1990–4): it argued that it has a special obligation towards Hungarians living outside Hungary. ‘Minorities: That Other Europe’, The Economist, 25 December— 7 January 1994, and Edith Oltay, ‘Minorities as Stumbling Block in Relations with Neighbors’, RFEIRL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 19, 8 May 1992.
Sharon Fisher, ‘Turning Back?’, Transition, vol. 1, no. 1, 30 January 1995, p. 62. Although no government had been formed after elections on 1 October 1994, Meciar’s party and two small parties formed a voting bloc and took over the broadcast media and intelligence service and ousted the privatization minister.
Peter Javurek, ‘US, EU Formally Express Disquiet on Slovak Turmoil’, Reuter, 25 October 1995. The concern stemmed from the prime minister’s suspected involvement in the kidnapping of the president’s son.
Agence Europe, 18 November 1995, and ‘Madness’, The Economist, 2 December 1995. The EP was reacting to Meciar’s attempts to expel an opposition party from parliament.
‘Nice New Friends’, The Economist, 21 December 1996; Agence Europe no. 6922, 26 February 1997. The EU has urged Slovakia to approve a law on the use of minority languages.
‘Tongue-tied’, The Economist, 13 September 1997.
European Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: 3. The Opinions of the European Commission on the Applications for Accession. Summaries and Conclusions’, COM (97) 2000, 16 July 1997.
Since 1993, Slovakia has signed dozens of agreements with Russia. ‘The Visegrad Three …’, The Economist, 9 March 1996.
This was apparently because in Slovakia there was a marked deterioration. Because Romania is so much further behind (economically and politically) and further away (geographically), expectations for it are lower; it would not have joined the EU in the first enlargement eastwards, whereas Slovakia might have.
Final Report: Evaluation of the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme 1992–1997, prepared by ISA Consult, Sussex University European Institute, and GSW Europe (Brighton and Hamburg, 1997).
Milada Anna Vachudova, ‘The Visegrad Four: No Alternative to Cooperation?’, RFEIRL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 34, 27 August 1993.
‘PHARE Annual Report 1994’, pp. 11–12. The programme resulted from a December 1992 Commission proposal and a 1993 EP request; a pilot PHARE programme began in 1993.
‘Concrete Heads’, The Economist, 16 September 1995. On relations among the Visegrad countries, see George Kolankiewicz, ‘Consensus and Competition in the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, InternationalAffairs, vol. 70, no. 3, 1994.
Frans Andriessen, Speech at the UK Presidency Conference, ‘Europe and the World After 1992’, London 7 September 1992.
Report of the Commission to the Council on the Promotion of Intraregional Cooperation and “Bon Voisinage”, prepared for the General Affairs Council of 6–7 March 1995, p. 1.
The report is in EC Bulletin no. 6, 1992, pt. I.31. 60. Presidency Conclusions, Essen European Council, SN 300/94, Annex IV, pp. 24–5.
Jenonne Walker contends that the EC made a Czech-Slovak customs union a precondition for continued association. In ‘International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts’, Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, p. 110.
Sharon Fisher, ‘Czech-Slovak Relations Two Years After the Elections’, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 27, 8 July 1994, p. 11.
In December 1991, the Community and the member states adopted criteria for recognizing new states in Eastern Europe, which included respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights and guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national minorities. ‘Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”’, EPC Press Release P.128/91, 16 December 1991. These go well beyond international law standards for recognizing statehood.
The Gabcikovo dam dispute had been defused (see Section 7.3.3), but the issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was still problematic.
Originally the Quadrangolare, then Pentagonale, then Hexagonale (as more states joined), this was an attempt by then Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis to increase Italy’s presence in Eastern Europe. The initiative was to complement Community policy. Sergio Romano has argued that the undeclared aim was to prevent East European countries from falling completely under German influence. Sergio Romano, Guida alla Politica Estera Italiana: Dal Crollo del Fascismo al Crollo del Comunismo (Milan: Rizzoli, 1993), p. 205. See also Vojtech Mastny, ed., Italy and East-Central Europe: Dimensions of the Regional Relationship (Boulder: Westview, 1995).
Conclusions of the Presidency, Florence European Council, 21–2 June 1996, EU Bulletin, pt. I.14; European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on European Union Cooperation with the Central European Initiative (CEI)’, COM (96) 601 final, 4 December 1996.
European Commission, ‘Report on the Current State of and Perspectives for Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region’, COM (96) 609 final/3, 21 February 1996; EUBulletin no. 10, 1994, pt. 1.3.21.
Andrzej Podraza, The Western European Union and Central Europe: A New Relationship, RIIA Discussion Paper no. 41 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp. 28–9.
Jopp, Strategic Implications, p. 31. In 1992, the WEU and NATO separately declared their willingness to support UN or CSCE peacekeeping missions; both were monitoring the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. Their rivalry stemmed from the fact that some states (notably France) preferred to develop the WEU as Europe’s primary defense organization, while others preferred NATO. Relations improved by the fall of 1992, when formal mechanisms of cooperation were agreed.
For background on the dispute, see Vera Rich, ‘Central Europe II: The Battle of the Danube’, The World Today, vol. 48, no. 2, December 1992 and ‘The Murky Politics of the Danube’, The World Today, vol. 49, nos. 8–9, August—September 1993.
Sharon Fisher, ‘The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Controversy Continues’, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 37, 17 September 1993, p. 8.
Nicholas Denton and Ariane Genillard, ‘Hungary Stokes Bitter Row Over Danube Dam’, The Financial Times, 20 May 1992.
See Tony Barber, ‘Danube Dam Splits Nations’, The Independent, 9 January 1993, and Nicholas Denton and Anthony Robinson, ‘Danube Dam Threatens to Open Floodgates of Hostility’, The Financial Times, 29 October 1992. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia opposed the dam project, another source of tension between the Slovak government and the Hungarian minority. See Reisch, ‘Meciar and Slovakia’s Hungarian Minority’, p. 19.
Karoly Okolicsanyi, ‘Slovak-Hungarian Tension: Bratislava Diverts the Danube’, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 49, 11 December 1992, p. 52.
Lionel Barber, ‘Danube Row Hits Plan to Widen EC’, The Financial Times, 23 October 1992.
Anthony Robinson, ‘End In Sight to Danube Dam Row’, The Financial Times, 30 October 1992.
Barber, ‘Danube Dam Splits Nations’.
‘Negotiations on Gabcikovo Dam Fail Again’, European Report 20 February 1993.
Agence Europe no. 5934, 6 March 1993. The Commission had suggested that two-thirds of the Danube’s waters be kept in the river, allowing one-third to be directed to the by-channel supplying the Gabcikovo power station. Agence Europe no. 5922, 18 February 1993.
Munuera, PreventingArmed Conflict, p. 22. The Commission never actually threatened to delay the Europe agreement with Slovakia, although Hungary had asked it to do so. Instead, it emphasized that it would be in both countries’ interests to reach an agreement. The Commission’s mandates to negotiate Europe agreements with the Czech Republic and Slovakia, though, were approved on 5 April 1993, two days before the agreement to send the dispute to the ICJ.
David Buchan, ‘Summit Backs Sovereign Bosnia’, The Financial Times, 3 June 1993. Kohl’s backing for the proposal may have been timed to ensure France’s support for the Copenhagen European Council conclusions on enlargement.
David Buchan, ‘New French Pact Aims to Avoid “Second Yugoslavia”’, The Financial Times, 10 June 1993.
Jopp, Strategic Implications, p. 53 and Jonathan Eyal, ‘France’s False Sense of Security’, The Independent, 27 January 1994.
Tom Dodd, ‘Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Research Paper no. 94/131, House of Commons Library, 19 December 1994, p. 12.
‘French Proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe (Copenhagen, 22 June 1993)’, statement translated by the Press Department of the French Embassy in London.
Adrian Bridge, ‘Slovaks Protest as their Freedoms are Whittled Away’, The Independent, 1 April 1996.
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© 2004 Karen E. Smith
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Smith, K.E. (2004). Conflict Prevention. In: The Making of EU Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230536784_7
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