Decline into Oblivion, 1930–31

Abstract

The Soviet Union’s victory over Chinese forces in 1929 should have come to be regarded as a major triumph. In the military sphere, it had conducted an intelligent campaign, co-ordinating ground and air strengths in an action which could not be matched by Chinese forces. The military side had been supplemented by a timely and well-staged international information effort, which succeeded in convincing the international community that the Soviet Union had responded militarily in order to stop the Chinese authorities in their attempt to evict Russian nationals from the CER and Manchuria.¹ The Soviet Union had also chosen a strategically opportune moment to launch its military action, both cutting off the Manchurian forces from receiving any support from the central government at Nanking, and, simultaneously, prevented the northern forces from contributing to the national government’s own struggle with the rebel troops under General Feng Yü-hsiang and the so-called reorganisers.² Where the Soviet authorities failed to gain full advantage, however, was in the diplomatic end-game.